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1. Introduction 
 
Global warming is essentially an economic and political problem. The atmosphere is a 
global public good. Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that contribute to global warming have 
the same damaging impact, whatever country they originate from. All regions of the world 
are affected, regardless of whether and to what extent they contribute to the problem. 
Protecting the atmosphere and therefore preventing global warming implies a drastic 
reduction in total greenhouse gas emissions. However, in the absence of an international 
agreement on emissions control, countries tend to adopt free-riding behavior, whereby they 
rely on other countries to reduce emissions and incur the resulting abatement cost. The Kyoto 
Protocol was the first international agreement in which some countries committed to emission 
reduction targets for the period 2008-2012 (in Annex I to the protocol). A cap-and-trade 
system was introduced to enable the emergence of an international carbon price in order to 
efficiently attain the overall objective. The protocol¶V impact has, however, been limited, due 
to the lack of commitment from fast-growing emerging countries such as China, India and 
Brazil, and the non-ratification of the United States. The challenge of the Copenhagen 
summit in 2009 was to determine the rules for the post-Kyoto period. Its crucial focus was 
therefore to ensure the ratification of a global agreement on emission reduction targets 
including all major industrialized and emerging countries. Despite the fact that negotiations 
during the summit failed to reach a global consensus, in late January 2010 some countries, 
including major emerging nations, pledged their commitment to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as part of the Copenhagen 
Agreement. Emissions control commitments now cover 80% of 2005 global GHG emissions 
compared to barely more than a quarter for the Kyoto Protocol.  
 
These commitments, which have very different terms and conditions, have yet to be 
evaluated. In fact, the Copenhagen Accord adopted a different approach to the Kyoto 
3URWRFROE\DOORZLQJ³YDULDEOHJHRPHWU\´FRPPLtments depending on the country (Casella et 
al. 2010). Annex I countries committed to reducing emissions on an absolute basis, while all 
major emerging counties made commitments in relative terms. For instance, China and India 
pledged to reduce emissions per unit of GDP relative to 2005. Published analyses of the 
Copenhagen pledges reach the same conclusion: although the national commitments made in 
Copenhagen reflect a significant shift relative to trend scenarios, this shift is a long way from 
the IPCC recommendations for limiting a global temperature increase to 2°C (Dellink et al. 
2010; Den Elzen et al. 2011a, Casella et al. 2010; Peterson et al. 2011; Criqui and Ilasca 
2010; Stern and Taylor 2010; van Vliet et al. 2012). Peterson et al. (2011) also showed that 
the pledges are not costly in either GDP or welfare terms. Taking a partial and general 
equilibrium approach, empirical studies have found that the cost for developed countries was 
less than 0.5% of GDP in 2020, and that the effects are more heterogeneous in developing 
countries (Saveyn 2011; den Elzen et al. 2011b; Peterson et al.2011). 
 
We contribute to the growing body of literature on the environmental and economic 
impact of the Copenhagen commitments by introducing these pledges into the bottom-up 
optimization model, TIAM-FR. The model depicts the energy system over the period 2005-
2050 in such a way as to minimize the net total cost of the system under a number of 
environmental, technological and demand constraints. To evaluate these commitments, we 
considered the most optimistic pledges for 2020 and made assumptions on the 2050 targets 
based on the policy ambitions announced by each country. We then compared these pledges 
to a business-as-usual scenario and to a global scenario compatible with the IPCC consensual 
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2-2.4°C objective (IPCC, 2007) where all countries are constrained by a global mitigation 
target.  
 
We aim to answer the following questions:  
- Can we limit temperatures to 2°C with the most favorable pledges announced by 
countries?  
- What are the regional energy system costs that result from these two climate 
scenarios? 
 
2. Model and climate policies 
2.1 TIAM-FR model 
 
This analysis is based on the TIAM-FR model (the French version of the TIMES 
Integrated Assessment Model), a bottom-up optimization model developed under the Energy 
Technology Systems Analysis Program (ETSAP). It depicts the world energy system with a 
detailed description of different energy forms, resources, technologies and end-uses (Ricci 
and Selosse 2012). End-use demands (i.e. energy services) are based on socio-economic 
assumptions and are exogenous over the planning horizon (2005-2050). The basic principle 
of the model is a broad linear optimization of substitution possibilities in the energy system 
between explicit technologies and commodity flows under constraints. The model assumes 
perfect markets and foresight and is therefore suitable for normative analysis. The model 
minimizes the total discounted cost of the energy system over the entire model horizon.  
 
The model is geographically integrated into 15 global regions (Industrialized countries: 
Australia-New Zealand (AUS); Canada (CAN), United-States of America (USA), Western 
Europe (EU-15, Iceland, Malta, Norway and Switzerland, WEU), Eastern Europe (EEU), 
Japan (JPN); Fast developing countries: India (IND), China (includes Hong Kong excludes 
Chinese Taipei, CHI); Developing countries: Africa (AFR), Central and South America 
(CSA), Middle-East (includes Turkey, MEA), Mexico (MEX), South-Korea (SKO), Other 
developing Asian countries (includes Chinese Taipei and Pacific Islands, ODA), Former 
Soviet Union (include the Baltic states, FSU)). The regions are linked by energy trading 
variables. These trade variables transform the set of regional modules into a single 
multiregional energy model, where actions taken in one region may affect all other regions. 
This feature is essential when global as well as regional energy and emission policies are 
simulated. For each region, a total net present value of the stream of annual costs is 
computed, discounted to the year 2005. These regional discounted costs are then aggregated 
into a single total cost, which is the objective function to be minimized by the model. Annual 
costs include investment costs, operation and maintenance costs, fuel costs (mining and 
imports), the cost of trade and the residual value of technologies at the end of the horizon. 
 
The objective function is: 
 
 ܸܰܲ ൌ෍ ෍ ሺͳ ൅ ݀௥ǡ௬ሻ௥௘௙௬ି௬ כ ܣܰܰܿ݋ݏݐሺݎǡ ݕሻ௬א௬௘௔௥௦ோ௥ୀଵ  
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where NPV is the net present value of the total cost; ANNcost(r,y) is the total annual cost in 
region r and year y; d(r,y) is the discount rate, refy is the reference year for discounting, years 
is the set of years and R the set of regions (Loulou, 2008). 
        Through its integrated climate module, the model makes it possible to analyze and make 
assumptions on atmospheric GHG concentrations and temperature changes. It integrates CO2, 
CH4 and N2O greenhouse gases. 
 
2.2 Climate policies 
 
Two climate scenarios and a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario are simulated in the 
model: 
- BAU scenario: In the BAU scenario, no climate policy is assumed.  
 
 
- Glob_50 scenario: The Glob_50 scenario assumes that global CO2 emissions are 
reduced by 50% in 2050 compared to the 2000 level. This scenario is compatible 
with the UNFCCC consensual 2-2.4°C objective (as specified by IPCC, 2007). All 
regions are bound by the global climate constraint. 
 
 
- Cop_15 scenario: This scenario represents the most optimistic CO2 mitigation 
targets by 2020, as expressed in the Copenhagen Agreement by Europe, the 
United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, China and India. Targets for 2050 were 
assumed according to the policy ambitions of each country as published in 
literature. This is a regional scenario in which only these countries are bound by 
the climate constraint. Table I presents the Copenhagen pledges.  
 
 
Table I: Cop 15 targets and 2050 assumptions for CO2 emissions 
 
Regions Year ref. Year target Targets Reduc. type 
WEU-EEU 1990 2020 
Pessimistic: 20% 
Emissions reduction Optimistic: 30% 
2050* 80% 
USA 2005 2020 17% Emissions reduction 2050 83% 
AUS 2000 2020 
Pessimistic: 5% 
Emissions reduction Optimistic: 25% 
2050 80% 
CAN 2005 2020 17% Emissions reduction 2050 83% 
JPN 1990 2020 25% Emissions reduction 2050 80% 
CHI 2005 2020 
Pessimistic: 40% CO2 intensity 
reduction Optimistic: 45% 
2050 10% Emissions reduction 
IND 2005 2020 
Pessimistic: 20% CO2 intensity 
reduction Optimistic: 25% 
2050 10% Emissions reduction 
 
* 2050 values are assumptions based on the policy ambitions announced for each country except 
China and India for which we have purposely chosen a stringent emissions reduction target 
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3. Results 
 
The results focus on the impact of climate policies on CO2 emissions and energy system 
costs. 
3.1 Environmental impact of climate policies 
 
In the BAU scenario, the atmospheric concentration of CO2 reaches 472 ppm in 2050, 
while beyond 400 ppm CO2, it is impossible to stabilize global warming below 2-2.4°C 
(IPCC, 2007). In Cop_15 atmospheric CO2 concentration continues growing to reach 
433 ppm in 2050. Meanwhile, the global constraint (Glob_50) that consists in reducing CO2 
emissions by 50% compared to the year 2000 allows a stabilization of the atmospheric 
concentration of CO2 at 403 ppm in our model. To meet the 2-2.4°C target (Glob_50), global 
CO2 emissions should decrease by 4.47 Gt in 2020 and by 40.99 Gt in 2050 compared to the 
BAU pathway. However, in Cop_15 global emissions are only reduced by 2.23 Gt in 2020 
and by 28.46 Gt in 2050 compared to BAU. Table II shows how the emissions reduction 
effort is shared out between countries in the two target scenarios. 
Table II: CO2 emissions reductions compare the BAU (Gt CO2) 
Regions 2020 2050 
 Glob_50 Cop_15 Glob_50 Cop_15 
Industrialized countries -1.138 -2.174 -11.54 -13.58 
Fast developing countries -1.405 -0.135 -17.87 -15.067 
Developing countries -1.927 +0.072 -11.57 +0.181 
World -4.47 -2.237 -40.99 -28.46 
 
In Cop_15, CO2 emissions are primarily led by industrialized countries in 2020. In 2050, 
ambitious assumptions for China and India (10% emissions reductions) lead to a reduction of 
15 Gt of CO2 emissions compared to BAU. India and China contribute more than 50% of the 
overall objective. Glob_50 benefits industrialized countries in 2020 and 2050 compared to 
Cop_15, while developing countries are heavily constrained in 2020 and 2050. The 
contribution of fast developing countries is also higher in this scenario.  
We find that the optimistic commitments pledged by countries in Cop_15 do not reduce 
emissions enough in 2020 and that even favorable assumptions for 2050 are not sufficient to 
meet the global 2-2.4°C objective. Moreover, to achieve the expected global objective, we 
show that fast-developing countries must reduce their emissions further and that developing 
countries need to participate in efforts to reduce CO2 emissions. 
 
3.2 Economic impact of climate policies 
 
This section evaluates the energy system cost implications of the two climate scenarios. 
The total system cost resulting from the Copenhagen pledges (Cop_15) and the global 
constraint (Glob_50) consists of investment costs, variable costs, fuel costs (mining, import), 
fixed annual operation and maintenance costs, and the cost of trade (import-export). Table III 
shows the abatement costs and carbon marginal cost (carbon price) per region. 
In Cop_15, the total system abatement cost, expressed as the cost of additional mitigation 
expenditure compared to the BAU scenario in 2020, is estimated at USD 61 billion (increase 
of 0.5% compared to BAU). The largest share of this cost is incurred by industrialized 
countries (92% of the global cost). The abatement cost is relatively high for Europe, Australia 
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and Japan. These are also the countries with the highest emissions reduction constraint for 
2020 (table I). The carbon marginal costs are also the highest for these regions, reflecting the 
severity of the constraint (34 USD/tCO2 for Australia, 58 USD/tCO2 for Europe and 
92 USD/tCO2 for Japan). In 2050, fast-developing countries (India and China) are more 
constrained by our emissions reductions assumptions than they are by their commitments for 
2020, therefore additional abatement costs (compared to BAU 2050) are higher for these 
regions (about USD 600 billion). In 2050, the marginal carbon cost reaches 447 USD/tCO2 in 
Japan, 245 USD/tCO2 in Europe, 86 USD/tCO2 in China and 75 USD/tCO2 in India. 
In Glob_50, the model minimizes the global cost of the system. The abatement cost is 
higher than Cop_15 for almost all developing countries and it increases sharply for China and 
India from 2020. In 2050, 45% of the total abatement cost is incurred by China and 10% by 
India. Developing and industrialized countries contribute to the global abatement cost at 
respectively 22% and 23%. Japan and Europe, where marginal abatement costs are high, 
benefit from this policy. In 2050, abatement costs in these countries are 60% lower than in 
Cop_15. The carbon price in Glob_50 for all regions is 11 USD/tCO2 in 2020, 48 USD/tCO2 
in 2030, 74 USD/tCO2 in 2040 and 94 USD/tCO2 in 2050. 
 
Table III: Annual abatement costs and carbon prices per region 
 
 
 
 
Regions 
Regional abatement cost (M US$)*  Carbon marginal cost 
in Cop_15 (USD/tCO2) Glob_50 Cop_15 
2020 2050 2020 2050 2020 2050 
AFR 3,542 40,412 259 13,585 - - 
AUS 3,700 6,114 2,877 660 34 41 
CAN -886 6,784 727 4,443 12 16 
CHI 24,676 639,203 2,353 493,888 - 86 
CSA 5,203 39,885 3,523 6,533 - - 
EEU 1,345 35,195 18,616 49,629 58 245 
FSU 1,897 75,136 -1,553 4,608 - - 
IND 6,207 147,698 -97 81,294 - 70 
JPN 31 24,424 17,842 88,034 92 447 
MEA -462 36,374 3,879 -9427 - - 
MEX 847 12,518 1,014 2,103 - - 
ODA 657 87,752 -4,112 2,599 - - 
SKO 2,834 30,722 -503 -1,453 - - 
USA -1,658 181,594 75 251,722 - 183 
WEU 3,521 87,561 16,575 226,091 58 245 
 
* The regional abatement cost is the cost of additional mitigation expenditure compared to the BAU 
scenario for each region. A negative sign indicates advantages due to exports.  
 
 
       The additional global discounted cost on the period 2005-2050 with a discount rate of 
5%1 (in absolute terms, compared to BAU) is USD 3,610 billion in Glob_50 and USD 3,050 
billion in Cop_15. In relative terms, this represents an increase of 2% in the global scenario 
and 1.6% in Cop_15. In Glob_50, the countries with the lowest discounted cost are 
industrialized countries. Although this last scenario minimizes the global discounted cost of 
the system, it appears to be costly for fast-developing. For instance, the discounted cost of the 
                                                          
1
 This discount rate is in line with the literature on the cost of climatic targets, particularly integrated models like 
the one used in this study (van Vuuren et al. 2010; van Vliet et al. 2012; Krey and Riahi 2009; den Elzen et al., 
2011a, 2011b). 
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system increases by 6.3% for China compared to BAU and 5.8% for India. We have 
conducted a sensitivity analysis on the discount rate because the long term costs of GHG 
abatement are highly affected by the choice of this parameter. A discount rate of 3% and 7% 
was simulated in the model. A higher discount rate give an incentive for delaying mitigation 
actions therefore, the global additional discounted cost is lower with a 7% discount rate and 
higher with a 3% discount rate (Glob_50_DR3%: USD 6,120 billion; Glob_50_DR7%: USD 
1,565 billion; Cop_15_DR3%: USD 6,120 billion; Cop_15_DR7%: USD 1,565 billion). At a 
regional level, the conclusion that the Glob_50 scenario is more costly for fast developing 
than for industrialized countries is robust regardless of the discount rate. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
       This paper assesses the environmental and economic effects of the Copenhagen Accord 
through a specific analysis of the pledges announced by countries in 2010. It compares it with 
the least cost option of a global agreement compatible with the 2°C target. Even when 
applying the most ambitious Copenhagen pledges for 2020 and favorable assumptions for 
2050, the emissions trend remains incompatible with the 2°C recommendation. Furthermore, 
reaching the overall 2°C target involves significant costs for China and India, which explains 
the difficulty of international negotiations. The 2°C objective seems very unlikely unless 
significant financial transfers are considered to fund the abatement cost to emerging 
countries. 
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